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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of Uwe Steinhoff’s discussion of the right of self-defense deals 
with situations where two or more parties are in a position to frustrate the 
other’s ambitions to use force.1 For example, George wants to shoot Henry 
before Henry can shoot him and vice-versa. These are situations of combat. 
But moralists’ and lawyers’ interest in such situations is not that of the 
* © 2018 Michael S. Moore.  Charles Walgreen University Chair, Center for 
Advanced Study Professor of Law and Philosophy, Co-Director of the Program in Law 
and Philosophy, University of Illinois. My thanks to the many who commented on this
paper at its presentation in San Diego in November, 2016, and particularly to Peter Westen, 
Alec Walen, and Uwe Steinhoff who gave me the benefit of their separate written comments
beforehand. 
1. See Uwe Steinhoff, Just War Theory: Self-Defense, Necessity, and the Ethics
of Armed Conflicts 4 (2016) [hereinafter Just War Theory] (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author).
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military instructor, which is how to win in such situations of physical 
combat.  It is rather to assess who wins morally in such situations, who is 
right and who is wrong in their use of force.  If one’s moral theories lead
one to conclude that each party’s moral success is achieved at the cost of 
another party’s moral failure, then we have a situation which Heidi Hurd
has dubbed, “moral combat.”2 
Steinhoff touts self-defense rights as being such as to permit or require
moral combat between persons.3  This is in part due to his conceptualizing 
self-defense rights in Hohfeldian terms—for the Hohfeldian schema of
rights in general is fundamentally oriented towards the allowance of moral 
combat, not just in self-defense situations, but generally.4  My main suggestion 
to Steinhoff in what follows is that he needs to be less Hohfeldian in his 
conceptualization of rights, the right to self-defense included. 
I shall proceed as follows.  I shall first describe what moral combat
would be if it existed, separate it into distinct species, and say why it is so
undesirable that one should be brought to acknowledge its existence only 
reluctantly and as a last resort.  I will then detail two ways in which rights 
to do things—often called “action rights” or “active rights”5—such as the 
right to defend oneself, are integrated into standard deontic logic: (1) Hohfeld’s 
way and (2) the older but still popular Kantian alternative that Hurd and I 
recently defended.6 The first of these is compatible with—indeed, inviting 
of—moral combat, whereas the second is not.7  Thirdly, I shall ask whether 
moral combat is an inevitable feature of our moral life, using various self-
defense scenarios to argue that—contrary to Steinhoff’s belief—it is not. 
This is taken to cut in favor of the older analysis of rights and against
Hohfeld’s analysis. 
II. MORAL COMBAT
Kant famously proclaimed that a conflict of duties was “inconceivable.”8 
To be obligated both to do some action and not to do that same action, 
was outrageous, so outrageous that Kant thought that morality could not 
2. HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 9–10 (1999).
3. See Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 4.
 4. Id. at 22, 24, 159. 
5. Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/rights/#1 [https://perma.cc/U4Q4-D5KE].
6. See generally HEIDI M. HURD & MICHAEL S. MOORE, THE HOHFELDIAN ANALYSIS 
OF RIGHTS (2018); MORAL COMBAT, supra note 2, at 280–81 (explaining Hurd’s view of
the interaction between Hohfeldian principles and deontological norms). 
7. See HURD, supra note 2, at 281. 
8. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 16 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
1996) (1797). 
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possibly be so constituted.9  Notice, however, that such conflict of 
obligations is not inconceivable in the sense that it would be contradictory 
to think that morality is so constituted.10  While it would be contradictory
to think both that one is obligated to do A and that one is not obligated to 
do A—external contradiction—it is not contradictory to think that
morality obligates us both to do, and not to do, one and the same action— 
internal contradiction only.11  Still, it would be a wildly unfair morally for
us to be moral losers no matter what we did.  Some malevolent Greek god
might foist such an unfair morality off onto the human race just for his 
own amusement in watching a struggle where the outcome was guaranteed 
to be moral failure no matter how pure the heart or strong the will, but it 
is hard for non-theists—or theists with a more benevolent god in mind— 
to imagine that morality gives us no chance to be good. 
Suppose the malevolent Greek god takes this last lesson to heart and 
thus creates a morality that obeys one of the strictures of standard deontic 
logic: it is not the case that one can be obligated to do A if one is obligated
not to do A and vice versa.12  In other words, OB(A) and OB(not-A) are
contraries of one another; both cannot be true although neither could 
be true.  Still, the god likes his fun with the human race. So he arranges things 
so that collectively—rather than individually—human beings cannot morally
succeed: one person’s moral success necessarily comes at the cost of another 
person’s moral failure.13  For example, each of two mothers, each of whom is
obligated to save her own child, seeks both to place her child on a plank 
that can only support one and to prevent the other mother from doing the 
same.14  While both mothers can fail in their obligations—both children 
drown—at most only one can succeed in doing the two things she is
obligated to do, which is to both save her child and prevent the other 
mother from saving hers.15 This second game is almost as enjoyable to
the malevolent Greek god as the first, because collective success will
elude the humans in this game as certainly as it eludes an individual in the 
case of conflicting obligations being owed by one and the same individual. 
9. Id. at 16–17. 
10. HURD, supra note 2, at 271–72. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.
 13. Id. at xi.
 14. See id. at 284, 288 (discussing Hurd’s variation on Cicero’s ancient two men on
a plank hypothetical). 
15. Id.
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Hurd refers to the second scenario as a situation of moral combat.16  She
argues that such situations would be undesirable because they make each
of us act as “moral gladiators” against our fellow moral agents.17  It is
as unfair to us collectively just as conflict of obligations is unfair to us 
individually.18  Morality demeans us in both cases by obligating us in a
way that guarantees we cannot all win—even if each is pure of heart and
strongly motivated to do what is right.19 
There are various kinds of moral combat that one can imagine might 
exist.  The scenario above is what Hurd and I call “strong moral combat.”20 
These are situations where at least one party is obligated to prevent another 
party from doing what would satisfy that other party’s obligation.21  Also 
seemingly possible is “weak moral combat,” where at least one party has 
a moral right to prevent what another party has a moral right to do.22  Given 
the two pure cases, one can also imagine the possibility of “mixed” cases 
of moral combat where at least one party is obligated to prevent what another 
party has a right to do, or where at least one party has a right to prevent 
what another party is obligated to do.  For seeming examples, think of two
variations of the two mothers and the plank above: one, Cicero’s original 
version of two men on a plank that can only support one—seemingly an 
instance of weak moral combat between rights to save oneself and to prevent 
the other from saving himself—and two, one adult seeking to exercise his
right to preserve his own life on the plank—and thus his right to prevent 
a child from being placed on the plank—competing with another adult
obligated to save her child by placing that child on the plank—one of the 
two kinds of mixed cases of moral combat. 
16. Id. at 9–10. 
17. Id. at 10. 
18. Id. at 272–73. 
19. Id. at xi.
 20. HURD & MOORE, supra note 6, at 36. 
21. HURD, supra note 2, at xi.  Notice moral combat is not constituted by the fact
that each mother is obligated to save her child; rather, strong moral combat would exist by
virtue of each mother being obligated to prevent the other from doing her obligation to
save her child.  This renders irrelevant the common reaction that perhaps each mother is
only obligated to try—that is, to use best efforts—to save her child, and thus, both could succeed
in satisfying these obligations.  Even if all obligations had as their content “tryings” rather 
than doings—which they do not, see Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 190 (1994)—one mother’s obligation to try to prevent the 
other mother’s success in her obligation to try to save her child would constitute strong 
moral combat, even though the definition of moral combat would shift a bit.  It would be
as gladiatorial and as unfair to obligate the person to try to undo what another is obligated
to try to do.  Gladiators who are obligated to try to kill one another, and to try to prevent 
themselves from being killed, will fight just like gladiators who are obligated both to kill
one another and to prevent themselves from being killed.
22. HURD & MOORE, supra note 6, at 36. 
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Weak and mixed moral combat is undesirable for the same reason strong 
moral combat is undesirable.  When we do what we have a moral right to 
do, we are doing right action. Yet if weak or mixed cases of moral combat 
exist, then in those situations one person’s ability to do what is right—that
is, what she has a right to do—comes at the cost of guaranteeing that
another cannot do what is right—right now in the senses either of being 
obligatory or having a right to do it.23  We would still be moral gladiators
pitted against one another, gladiators whose moral success in doing the
right thing depends on others not enjoying a like success. 
III. COMBATIVE AND NON-COMBATIVE ANALYSES OF RIGHTS
For present purposes we should simplify the deontic geography here by 
distinguishing just two analyses of what rights are. Best known is the 
Hohfeldian analysis.24  Hohfeld, following Bentham, held there to be two 
kinds of rights: passive rights and active rights.25  Such an analysis takes
rights to be part of the action-guiding machinery of both law and morality. 
Accordingly, both active and passive rights take actions as their objects.26 
Passive rights take the action of someone other than the right-holder as
their objects—thus the name, passive rights because the right-holder is
passive.27  Active rights, by contrast, take the action of the right-holder as
its content—the right-holder is thus active and thus the name for his kind
of right.28 If I have the right to go downtown, I have an active right; if I
have a right that you leave my land, I have a passive right. 
Hohfeld gives active and passive rights his own distinctive labels.  He
calls passive rights “claim-rights” and active rights, “privileges”—or sometimes, 
“liberties.”29  Hohfeld analyzes both sets of rights in terms of duties.30  A
passive right is the correlative of a duty on someone else’s part to do the
action that the right-holder had a right to.  An active right is to be analyzed 
as the absence of a duty—on the part of a right-holder—not to do the action
 23. See HURD, supra note 2, at xi. 
24. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 
AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed.,
1919).
25. Wenar, supra note 5; see also HOHFELD, supra note 24, at 24, 83. 
26. Wenar, supra note 5.
 27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. HOHFELD, supra note 24, at 37–39, 49. 
30. Id. at 35. 
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that the right-holder was privileged—or at liberty—to do.  To use the two
examples above: if X has a right that another, Y, leave X’s land, then X 
has a claim-right that Y leave X’s land; if X has a right to go downtown, 
then X has a privilege to go downtown.
Hohfeld’s analysis of rights is often accused of being a “deflationary
analysis of rights.”31  After all, the basic building block in the analysis is
duty; claim-rights are just duties on someone else and privileges are just 
the absence of duties on oneself. Hurd and I have urged that this 
deflationary criticism of Hohfeld’s analysis of passive rights is in error;
but with respect to Hohfeld’s analysis of active rights, the critique is right
on target.32 
With respect to this last point, notice how thin is the protection afforded 
one whose active right to do some action (A) is analyzed in Hohfeldian
terms as a mere privilege.  X’s right to do A means only that X has no
duty not to do A and that others, such as Y, have no (passive) right that X
not do A.  But, consistently with these two absences of duty by X and passive
right by Y, others—such as Y—are equally privileged to prevent X from 
doing A. Indeed, they may even be obligated to prevent X from doing what 
he is privileged to do, in Hohfeld’s sense of privilege. Further, in cases
where X is obligated to do A—and thus privileged to do A in the sense
that X is not obligated not to do A—others such as Y may still be privileged
and even obligated to prevent X from doing A. 
Hohfeld’s analysis of active rights—as mere privileges—thus obviously
allows for there to be moral combat of all three kinds: (1) weak moral
combat—where X has a privilege to do an act that Y is privileged to 
prevent; (2) mixed moral combat, where either X’s or Y’s privileges—but
not both—stem from a duty on their part to do what they are privileged to 
do; and (3) strong moral combat, where the privileges of both X and Y 
stem from duties on their part to do what they are privileged to do. 
To avoid this potential for moral combat, Hurd and I have proposed a
different analysis of active rights.33  On our alternative analysis, an active
right is to be identified with what we call a protected permission. A protected
permission is characterized by two sets of properties.  First, it is, as the
name suggests, a permission, as that term is understood in standard deontic 
logic. In this logic, permissions are of two kinds: unilateral permissions,
where one is permitted to do only one of an act/omission pair; or bilateral
permissions, where one is permitted to do either one of an act/omission 
31. E.g., HURD & MOORE, supra note 6, at 67. 
32. Id.
 33. Id. at 33–49.  Our analysis owes much to Kant, but we systematize Kant’s mostly
casual set of suggestions. 
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pair.34  If X has a unilateral permission to A, then X is obligated to do A
and not obligated not to do A; if X has a bilateral permission to A, then X 
is neither obligated to do A nor obligated not to do A.
The second characteristic of a protected permission—the kind of
permission with which we would identify active rights—has to do with
other people’s correlative duties.  Recall that on Hohfeld’s analysis, other 
people (Y) have no passive right that X not do what X has an active
right—or privilege—to do; but others such as Y also have no duty not to
prevent X from doing what X has a right to do. On our analysis, by contrast, 
others such as Y have a duty not to prevent X from doing whenever X has 
an active right to do. 
Our analysis of active rights does what it was intended to do, namely, 
rule out the possibility of there being moral combat of any of the three 
kinds earlier distinguished.  On our analysis of active rights as protected
permissions, when X has a right to do some action, A, it cannot be the case
that there is weak moral combat—that is, that others such as Y can equally 
have the right to prevent X from doing A.  Likewise, when X has the right
to do A, it cannot be the case that others such as Y are obligated to prevent
X from doing A; nor that when X’s right to do A is based on a duty on his 
part to do A, that Y can have the right to prevent X from doing A—that 
is, no mixed moral combat.  Nor can it be the case that Y is obligated to
prevent what X is obligated to do—no strong moral combat. 
We thus prefer our analyses of active rights to Hohfeld’s.  Moral combat 
is undesirable and unfair for the reasons stated earlier; it is also not a 
regrettably inevitable feature of our moral experience, as we have argued
elsewhere.35  Because of this, active rights—such as the right to self-
defense—should be analyzed as protected permissions and not as mere
Hohfeldian privileges. 
IV. SELF-DEFENSE
Is Steinhoff a Hohfeldian in his analysis of self-defense?  He appears to 
think that he is, for he analyzes the right of self-defense as “a claim-right, 
a liberty-right, and an act-specific agent-relative prerogative.”36  Yet what 
34. The latter permissions are called “options” in deontic logic; the former are the 
kinds of permissions one has when one has an obligation to do what one has a permission
to do. Id. at 20, 42. 
35. Id. at 50. 
36.  Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 21. 
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Steinhoff refers to as a claim-right in this context is distinctively not 
Hohfeldian.  As he puts it in an earlier paper, if a woman “has a claim-
right towards B to do x, this means that B is under a duty toward her, A, 
not to interfere with her doing x.”37 As we saw earlier, this is not how
Hohfeld would analyze a claim-right to self-defense; there are no such
active claim-rights for Hohfeld.38  And while Hohfeld would allow that
there be a claim-right to non-interference in the woman’s doing of X, this 
would be contingent and occasional, not an analytically necessary and
universal accompaniment to the women’s privilege to do X.
Steinhoff thus looks more Hurdian than Hohfeldian.  Steinhoff is, of 
course, entitled to be neither Hurdian nor Hohfeldian if he can work out
his own analysis of action rights such as the right to defend oneself.  The
best way to see how such a project would fare for Steinhoff is to follow 
what he concludes about various particular cases of self-defense.  Then
we can see whether moral combat in situations of self-defense is a live 
option for Steinhoff and then adjust his logic to be whatever is needed to 
fit those facts, whatever they turn out to be. 
A. Classic Blameworthy Aggressor Self-Defense
For no good reason Y comes at X with deadly force, intending to kill
X;39 X has the opportunity to use deadly force to prevent Y’s attack and
such use is the only means by which X may save his life. This is a case of 
classic self-defense between a wrongful and culpable aggressor and an innocent 
defender. 
Such self-defense scenarios present possibilities of moral combat at a 
variety of levels.  To see this, ask a variety of moral questions: 
1.	 Is Y obligated, nakedly at liberty—that is, a Hohfeldian
 privilege)—or have a right—that is, a protected permission)— 
to attack X with deadly force?
2a.	 Is X obligated, nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to defend
himself through his own use of deadly force to kill Y? 
37. Uwe Steinhoff, Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants, 16 J.
ETHICS 339, 340 n.2 (2012) (first emphasis omitted). 
38. 	See supra pp. 320–21. 
39. We do not need to stipulate what X knows or has reason to know about the 
nature of Y’s attack. Unlike Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 44, my own long-defended 
view is that deontic relationships are exclusively a matter of right and wrong-doing, 
without regard to the culpability with which such acts are done.  What one believes or
should believe are matters going only to the culpability with which an action is done; they
do not impact the deontic wrongness or rightness of the act itself. Notice that another 
party’s intention, such as Y’s in the hypothetical, matters but this comes as no surprise 
given such intention is but a circumstance in the context of X’s action.
322
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2b. 	 Is Y obligated, nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to resist 
X’s self-defensive use of deadly force by killing X? 
2c. 	 Is X obligated, nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to use 
deadly force to prevent Y from preventing X’s original 
use of deadly force in self-defense?
3a. 	 Is Z, a third-party bystander, obligated, nakedly at liberty,
or have a right, to use deadly force himself against Y—or 
to assist X in X’s use of such force—if that is the only 
way to prevent Y’s attack on X? 
3b.	 Is Y obligated, nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to resist 
Z’s use of deadly force—or to assist in the use of X’s
deadly force—by killing Z? 
3c.	 Is Z obligated, nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to use
deadly force to prevent Y from preventing Z’s original use 
of deadly force against Y and in aid of X?
4a. 	 Is Z obligated, nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to use 
deadly force himself against X—or to assist Y in Y’s use 
of such force against X—if that is the only way to prevent
X’s self-defensive killing of Y? 
4b. 	 Is X obligated, nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to resist 
Z’s use of deadly force—or to resist Z’s assistance in Y’s
use of deadly force—by killing Z?
4c. 	 Is Z obligated, nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to use
deadly force to prevent X from preventing Z’s original use 
of deadly force against X and in aid of Y?
I have made this list as long as it is so that one may have a template for 
the less central cases of self-defense that we shall discuss shortly.  In the 
present case, the list is so easily answered that few would have asked most
of these questions. I suspect there is well-nigh universal agreement— 
including Steinhoff—that:
1. 	 By hypothesis, Y is obligated not to attack X—and thus 
by standard deontic logic it is not the case that Y is obligated,
nakedly at liberty, or have a right, to attack X; 
2a. 	 X has a right and is nakedly at liberty to use deadly force 
in his own defense against Y; obligation is a different
matter—only those thinking X is obligated not to suicide 
would think he is obligated to defend himself. 
 323
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2b.	 Y is obligated not to resist X’s use of deadly force in
defense—and thus it is not the case that Y is obligated, 
nakedly at liberty, or has a right, to resist. 
2c. 	 X has a right and is at liberty to use deadly force to prevent 
Y from preventing X’s original use of deadly force; whether
X is obligated to use such force in these circumstances
again depends on where one came out in 2a about X’s 
obligation not to suicide. 
3a. 	 Z at least has a right and is nakedly at liberty to kill Y to
defend X; whether Z is obligated to do so for many would 
depend both on Z’s relationship to X and on the danger 
posed to Z if Z defends X. 
3b. 	 Y is obligated not to resist Z’s use of force as much as he
is obligated not to resist X’s use of force in 2b, thus it is 
not the case that Y is obligated, nakedly at liberty, or has
a right, to resist Z’s use of force. 
3c. 	 Z has a right and is nakedly at liberty to use deadly force 
to prevent Y from preventing Z’s original use of deadly
force against Y and in aid of X; whether Z is obligated to 
use such force in these circumstances depends partly on 
the factors—relationship to X and degree of risk to Z— 
described in 3a above, and partly on whether Z’s earlier
aiding of X constitutes an undertaking to aid X that Z must 
now carry through.
4a. 	 Z is obligated not to use deadly force against X—and is
obligated not to aid Y in Y’s use of deadly force against
X; it is therefore not the case that Z has an obligation, a
naked liberty, or a right to use such deadly force against
X—or to aid Y in Y’s use of deadly force against X.
4b. 	 X has a right and a naked liberty to resist Z’s use of deadly
force—and to resist Z’s aiding Y in Y’s use of deadly
force—by killing Z; whether X is obligated to use such
force depends on X’s obligation not to suicide as 
mentioned in 2a and 2c above. 
4c. 	 Z is obligated not to use deadly force to prevent X from 
preventing Z’s original use of deadly force against X and
in aid of Y; therefore, it is not the case that Z is obligated
or nakedly at liberty, or has a right, to use deadly force in 
these circumstances.
If all of these actions occur, there will thus be no moral combat.  There
will be plenty of actual, physical combat, to be sure. But there is no clash 
of duties or of rights between the parties.  X is right in all that he does, Y
324
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is wrong in all that he does, and Z is right insofar as he aids X and wrong 
insofar as he aids Y, so this is a morally tranquil scenario. 
Notice how intuitively compelling and exception-less is the question of 
Hurd’s and my no moral combat injunction: the wrongness of Y’s aggression 
(1) and the rightness of X’s self-defense (2a) fully determine the moral
status of all further actions and reactions down the chain, no matter how 
many parties are involved and no matter how many iterations one pursues. 
What is wrong for Y is wrong for X, Z, and everyone else; what is right 
for X is right for Y, Z, and everyone else. 
I see no evidence that Steinhoff would disagree with any of these 
conclusions.  Because, in such cases, he does not seek to justify moral
combat, such cases do not test his Hurdian versus Hohfeldian credentials.
Let us then press on to less standard cases of self-defense where Steinhoff’s 
conclusions become more interesting for these purposes.
B. Non-Blameworthy Aggressor Cases of Self-Defense
Steinhoff divides innocent aggressor cases of self-defense into several 
subcategories.40  There are cases where (1) Y is justified in making her 
attack on X by the good consequences of such an attack; (2) Y is justified
in making her attack on X by a categorical duty Y has to do what she
does—as when a mother is trying to save her child on a plank; (3) Y, the 
attacker, is innocent because of a status excuse—Y is too young or too 
mentally ill to rationally consider what wrong he is doing in attacking X, 
or where Y is innocent because ignorant, mistaken, or coerced with respect 
to what he is doing—Y does not realize that his action will kill X unless 
prevented, or X is threatened by another; or (4) Y is not even acting in posing
his threat to X.41  I shall consider each of these non-blameworthy aggressor 
self-defense scenarios in turn, asking in each case, first, how Steinhoff
proposes to resolve it, second, how such resolution squares with a Hurdian
or a Hohfeldian analysis, and third, how I would resolve such cases.
1. Consequentially Justified Aggressor Self-Defense 
Steinhoff chooses as his example one that is well-worn in the centuries-
old debate about the Catholic Doctrine of Double Effect, namely, “the 
tactical bomber who is about to destroy an ammunition factory in a 
 325
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proportionate, justified military attack, full well knowing that an innocent 
bystander will also be killed by his attack.”42  Steinhoff later adopts Jeff
McMahon’s particular version of this old hypothetical: 
There is a bomber crew of 5 people who have, in the context of a humanitarian
intervention, the mission to bomb and destroy a military target.  If they are 
successful, 100 innocent civilians in the state in which the intervention takes place
will be saved, and there are no alternative means of saving them.  However, 5
innocent villagers will be killed in this attack as a side effect.43 
I shall use in what follows the 1–4 template deployed earlier in regular cases 
of culpable aggressor self-defense.
1. The first on the list involves the moral status of the justified aggressor, 
namely, the bombers.  We are to assume they are justified in doing the
bombing that kills the five innocent villagers.  Yet it is important for present 
purposes that one understand just why the bombers are justified.  The law 
of war would say the bombers are justified because they are combatants
and they aim at legitimate military targets—which includes enemy combatants
—and they only foresee but do not intend the deaths of the five villagers.44 
The question of whether the war itself is justified is suspended; on this 
view the bombers are justified in their bombing irrespective of that larger 
question.
This is not the sense of justified we want here.  We want to operate, as
McMahan says, at the level of “basic morality,” that is, the morality free 
of the pragmatic considerations that may well justify the law of war’s 
separation of justifications for how a war is fought from justifications for 
fighting the war at all.45 In basic morality, there is no pass given combatants
who kill; their justification for killing, if they have one, must reach all the 
way down to the justness of the side for which they fight.46  This viewpoint
results, as Steinhoff sees, in rejecting the conclusion “that in all wars the 
combatants on both sides have the same liberty-right to kill enemy combatants,
provided they abide in the traditional jus in bello restrictions.”47 
So, we are to assume in Tactical Bomber that the bombers are justified
at the level of basic morality, not just by their role as combatants following
the rules of how wars should be fought.  We are thus to assume that the 
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bombers are fighting a just war, and achieving a good outcome in that war 
morally justifies the loss of five civilians as foreseen side-effects.
On these assumptions, one would think the answer to the first question 
is easy: the bombers are at least permitted and at liberty to kill the civilians; 
indeed, they may be obligated to do this, depending on how one views their
role and their obligations to win a just war. 
I thus have little sympathy for Steinhoff when he says that the bombers 
“are at best justified, but that does not make them innocent in the relevant
sense (namely in the sense of not wronging others).”48 This is on its face 
a contradiction; if the bombers are justified—at the level of basic morality 
—then they are at least permitted to bomb; if they are permitted to bomb, 
it cannot be the case that they are obligated not to bomb; unless they are
obligated not to bomb, they do no wrong when they do bomb. 
2a. It is easy to see one reason why Steinhoff issues his peculiar conclusion 
in (1) that bombers are justified but wrong in their bombing:49 it is because
Steinhoff thinks the five villagers have a right—in some sense—to shoot 
down the bombers before they can unleash their bombs.50  The villagers
have a right of self-defense.51 Steinhoff thus sees moral combat between the
right of the bombers to bomb and the right—or perhaps obligation—of 
the civilians to prevent the bombing by killing the bombers.52  Yet it only 
muddies things up to invent some Pickwickian sense of wrong with which
one can so label the bombers’ actions; this is supposed to soften the oddness 
of giving civilians a right of self-defense here. 
It does not help to tease out the nuances of this special sense of wrong, 
which Steinhoff does by saying the bombers “have forced the choice ‘My 
life, or his’ upon the civilians [and that] the civilians have not forced this 
choice on [the bombers].”53  Come again?  By hypothesis, the forcing of
the choice was the right thing to do—that is, it was both justified and just;
and if it was right for the bombers the forcing of the choice was right for 
the civilians and for everyone else.  There is no useful sense of wrong or unjust
here that does anything but confuse the issues.  Because of this asymmetry
of initiating the interaction, Steinhoff compounds the confusion by 
48. Id. at 341. 
49. Id.  The other reason is so Steinhoff can base claims to compensation on the
wrongness of such right actions. Id. at 365. 
50.  Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 192. 
51. Id. at 165. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 165 (emphasis added). 
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characterizing the bombers as unjust: the bombers are among “those who
initiate an unjust (albeit justified) attack.”54  Huh?55 
2b. Steinhoff continues his willingness to countenance moral combat
when (1) he concludes that, at least in one sense, “the tactical bomber may
still defend himself against the civilians.”56 
2c. And (2) when Steinhoff grants to the civilians the right to prevent
the bomber’s prevention of the civilians’ self-defensive use of deadly force.57 
Steinhoff eventually qualifies his conclusions in 2b and 2c.  About 2b, 
he appears to conclude that the civilians are “not liable” to the tactical
bombers defending themselves from the defensive force of the civilians,58 
yet the bombers, Steinhoff tells us, still have the right to defend themselves 
against the civilians’ use of defensive force.59  Steinhoff assures us that
“the claim that the bombers are liable to attack does not have the counter-
intuitive implication that the bombers cannot justifiably defend themselves 
against the villagers.”60 
As one can see, it is not easy to get a handle on Steinhoff’s conclusion 
about 2b, the bombers right to defend against the villagers’ self-defense force.
It looks like he comes out this way: the villagers’ right to use defensive 
force (2a) is only a naked, Hohfeldian liberty, not a protected permission
—what Steinhoff idiosyncratically appears to call a “claim-right” to do 
something.61  Likewise, the bombers (2b) only have a naked liberty as well.62 
So there is only a conflict of naked liberties, not of protected permissions 
(weak moral combat), of obligations (strong moral combat), or of 
obligation/protected permission pairs (mixed moral combat). 
This structure of answers appears to be duplicated for Steinhoff once 
one considers third parties’ actions, either those aiding the bombers (4a,
4b, 4c) or those aiding the villagers (3a, 3b, 3c).  Steinhoff’s view appears 
to be that third parties may aid the villagers in their defense against the 
bombers (3a), with the same naked liberty of the bombers to resist (3b) 
and be resisted in return (3c).63  Likewise, that third parties may aid the
bombers in their prevention of the villagers’ defensive effort (4a), with the
 54. Id. at 178. 
55. To be sure, Steinhoff is not the only philosopher who uses these peculiar locutions.
Yet it does nothing to advance the argument—that those like the villagers have both a right 
of self-defense and a right to compensation if they are bombed—to say that rights-
infringements are “somewhat wrong” and that only right-violations are “really wrong.”
56.  Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 165. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 178. 
59. Id. at 189. 
60. Id.
 61. Id. at 191. 
62. Id.
 63. Id. at 178. 
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same naked liberty of the villagers to resist (4b) and be resisted in turn 
(4c).64 
There is seemingly a lot of moral combat contemplated here by Steinhoff. 
For Steinhoff, no less than for Hohfeld, having a privilege—naked
liberty—to do something is a moral status, a kind of active moral right to
do that thing; and having such a status has the implication that others have 
no (passive) right that you not do it—that is, that you have no duty not to
do it.65  Each side of these situations of actual, physical combat between 
the bombers, the villagers, and their respective friends, is thus morally loaded
for Steinhoff. In Hohfeld’s sense, they each are acting within their moral
right, striving to do right even though only one of them can succeed in what 
they are trying to achieve.66 
If I shared Steinhoff’s sense about how these cases should come out, I 
would strip the analysis of any moral overtones: I would say no one has 
any moral right to do any of these actions, starting with the bombers.  All
any of them have is an absence of a duty to do or not to do any of the 
things they do, entailing that no one has a right that they not do what they 
want. They each thus have but naked liberties.  So construed, there would
be no moral combat in such a situation; only a moral state of nature in which
all are free—nakedly at liberty—to compete for scarce goods—that is, 
life—that not all can have. 
Yet such justified aggressor cases do not seem to be moral state of nature
cases; not only is this because killing people does not seem as morally 
trivial as taking the last of the ice-cream in some first-come, first-serve
buffet line, but also because the justification of the bombers’ bombing is 
more than an absence of a duty not to bomb.  The bombers have a right to 
bomb—because of which it is right that they bomb—in senses stronger 
than that. And if this is so, then that rights-determined moral rightness 
should be carried all the way down the chain of action and reaction. 
My view of these kind of cases is a very simple one, one that—like the
moral state of nature interpretation—also does not admit the existence of 
moral combat.  My view is as follows: (1) the bombers are “protectedly”
permitted—and perhaps obligated—to bomb; (2a) the villagers are not
permitted to resist and indeed are obligated not to resist; (2b) thus, should 
the villagers resist, the bombers are protectedly permitted to prevent it;
 329
 64.  Id. at 178–79. 
65.  Id. at 33, 178. 
66.  See supra Section III. 























   
 
  
      
 
 
and (2c) the villagers are obligated not to block the bomber’s prevention 
in this regard.  Further, (3a) those who would aid the villagers are obligated
not to do so and (3b) may be resisted if they do, which (3c) resistance may
itself not be resisted by those who would aid the villagers.  Further, (4a) 
those who aid the bombers are protectedly permitted to do so, (4b) may
not be resisted if they do, and (4c) do no wrong when they use force to
overcome that resistance. In short, there is no combat here that is not 
wrongful for one of the sides who engages in it.  There is thus no moral 
combat on this no more than the state of nature interpretation and either 
state of affairs is thus fully compatible with the Hurdian analysis of active-
rights as protected permissions.67 
2. Agent-Relative Justified Aggressor Self-Defense 
I have more sympathy for Steinhoff’s moral free-for-all resolution of
extended self-defense in cases where the aggressor is justified, not by the
net good consequences of his action, but by what has come to be called 
the “reasons of autonomy” we each have to prefer both ourselves and those 
near and dear to us.68  Hurd’s already mentioned variation on Cicero’s two 
men on a plank hypothetical will serve to illustrate this range of cases.69 
After a shipwreck, two mothers, X and Y, are struggling to keep their
infant children alive in the open sea. There is but one plank available to 
save anybody.  It is insufficient to support either adult mother; it is also
insufficient to support both infants; it is sufficient to save one infant.  Both
mothers reach the plank at the same time; at t1 both seek to place their
infant on the plank. Simultaneously each seeks to prevent the other from 
succeeding in placing that other mother’s child on the plank.  Despite these 
efforts, both infants are on the plank anyway, and it is sinking.  At t2, each
mother seeks to throw the other’s infant off the plank to its certain death.
Simultaneously each seeks to prevent the other from doing this. 
Moral combat?  If I read Steinhoff correctly,70 he will initially—that is, 
at t1—treat this case as another amoral free-for-all.  At t1, X is nakedly at liberty 
to put her child—X1—on the plank, and at the same time, Y is nakedly at 
liberty to prevent this innocent threat to her own child (Y1); and vice-versa 
when the parties are reversed. Further, still at t1, X is nakedly at liberty to 
prevent Y from preventing X from placing X1 on the plank, Y is nakedly 
67. See discussion supra pp. 317–19, 321; HURD, supra note 2, at 280 n.7.
 68. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 165 (1986). 
69. See hypothetical supra pp. 317–19. 
70. I take it that the intended payoff of Steinhoff adding “agent-specific agent-relative 
prerogative” to liberty-rights and claim-rights for a complete analysis of what it means to 
have an active right, is to give him the results he desires about the cases considered in the
text.  Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 31–32, 205. 
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 72.  As Steinhoff acknowledges in Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 205. 
 71.  See HURD, supra note 2, at 285. 
73.  HURD, supra note 2, at 272. 
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at liberty to resist this preventative action by X, and vice-versa when the
parties are reversed. 
At t2, however, X is not at liberty or permitted to throw Y1 from the 
plank so as to save X1; rather, X is obligated not to kill Y1, by throwing 
Y1 off the plank, Y is obligated to resist the killing of Y1 by X should X seek 
to violate this obligation, and vice-versa when the parties are reversed.
Further, still at t2, X is obligated not to prevent Y from preventing X from 
throwing Y1 from the plank, Y is obligated to resist this preventative effort
by X, and vice-versa when the parties are reversed.  Finally, at both t1 and 
t2, X’s friends are nakedly at liberty to help her in each of X’s efforts that 
do not violate her obligations, and Y’s friends are nakedly at liberty to
help her in each of Y’s efforts that do not violate her obligations. 
Already, in its very first assertion, this analysis runs into trouble.  The
reason Hurd made it a parent that is fighting for the plank is to bring in 
a—seemingly agent-relative—obligation:71  X and Y are each morally obligated 
to place their child on the plank and to prevent the other from preventing 
that.72  So neither mother is exercising a mere privilege when she places
her child on the plank. This means that if each mother has a privilege to 
prevent the other from placing her child on the plank, then she is in
(mixed) moral combat with the other mother—by being permitted to prevent 
what the other is obligated to do. Alternatively, the situation at t1 could 
be a case of strong moral combat.  X is obligated to place X1 on the plank, 
and Y is obligated to prevent it, and vice-versa.  But perhaps not at t2, where 
for Steinhoff, no such moral combat need exist: each mother is obligated 
not to throw the other’s child off the plank, and each mother is obligated 
to prevent any such effort by the other if it should be made.73 
My own view is that the situation at t1 should be treated similarly to the 
situation at t2: neither mother is at liberty or is permitted to thwart the placement
of the other’s child on the plank because each mother is obligated not to 
do that. Moral combat at t1 disappears once this liberty-permission to thwart
is eliminated.  And at t2 each mother is obligated not to throw the other child 
off the plank, so there is no moral combat there either.  Unfortunately, these 
resolutions of the two mothers’ dilemmas at t1 and t2 seemingly result in 
the death of both infants if each mother does what she is obligated to do; put 
more strongly, morality seemingly requires both infants to die.  Benjamin
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Cardozo recognized this unhappy consequence of obligating each person 
in a lifeboat not to throw anyone else overboard but comforted himself 
with the thought that perhaps some would voluntarily sacrifice themselves
to save the rest.74  No such comfort is available in the present situation; 
for each mother is obligated to save her child—that is, she is not permitted
to volunteer that child for sacrifice.75 
Did we conclude too quickly that at t1 each mother is obligated not to 
thwart the other mother’s placement of her child on the plank and that at 
t2 each mother is obligated not to throw the other mother’s child off the
sinking plank?  After all, there is what I have called the “almost dead”— 
or mere “acceleration of death”—exception to our duties not to kill innocents.76 
When good consequences are in the offing, I have argued that one may
(1) shoot down an airplane headed to the capital—because the occupants 
of the plane will die soon anyway even if the plane is not shot down;
(2) separate Siamese twins and give the shared organs to one only—thus
killing the other—when without the separation both will die soon anyway;
(3) cut the rope on which another mountain climber’s life depends, if
otherwise the weight of the down-rope climbers will drag all down the cliff;
and (4) kill and eat the weakest of a lifeboat filled with four persons, when 
the alternative of not eating the one is that he too will die along with the
other three.77 
Given this exception, one might argue that each mother is not obligated 
not to prevent the saving of, and not to kill, the other’s child.  For if both 
infants stay on the plank, the non-saved or killed child is dead anyway, 
just a little bit later.  Yet notice this is not true in this version of the plank 
case: neither child is almost dead because the other might be the one to 
die.78  There is, in other words, no inevitability in the victim’s death as
there is in the earlier described versions of the plane, Siamese twins, mountain 
climber, and lifeboat cases—for in these latter cases the passengers on the 
plane are dead no matter what, the twin who dies could not survive even 
with separation and transfer of shared organs to it, the down-rope climbers 
74. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 113 (4th
prtg. 1938) (“There is no rule of human jettison.  Men there will often be who, when told
that their going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and make 
the plunge into the waters.  In that supreme moment, the darkness for them will be illumined 
by the thought that those behind will ride to safety.  If none of such mold are to be found
aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the 
chances of the waters.”).
75. HURD, supra note 2, at 285. 
76. MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS,
AND METAPHYSICS 65–68 (2009). 
77. See id. at 66. 
78. HURD, supra note 2, at 284. 
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are dead no matter what, and the cabin boy who is killed and eaten was 
too weak to survive even if another were killed to save him.  The plank
case is more like the choice given the mother of two children by the Nazi
officer in the film, Sophie’s Choice: neither child is inevitably dead—the 
tragedy of the film is that it depends on Sophie’s choice.79 
My own view is that the almost dead exception does apply to these last,
Sophie’s Choice, variations of the almost dead exception. In which case
each mother is obligated not to thwart the other’s attempts to place her child 
on the plank and each is obligated not to throw the other’s child off the
plank only so long as it is not clear the other mother will not yield and both
children will sink.  When both children are about to drown (t3), each mother’s 
obligations—to save and to thwart—cease and they are nakedly at liberty
at t3 to throw off the other child, throw off their own child, and to prevent
the other from throwing off either child. To be sure, such a moral state of nature 
may result in both infants’ deaths—if the two mothers cannot work out
some accommodation—but at least morality does not require that no such
accommodation be reached, and that both infants must therefore die. 
Notice that at t3 there is no moral combat—at least no more than at t1 
and t2—and Hurd’s alternative logic of rights—ruling it out—is secure in
such cases. And if there is a t4 where one child is truly almost dead—that 
is, gets to such weakened condition as not to survive even if placed upon
the plank—then the other mother is both protectedly permitted and obligated 
to throw it off, and the weakened child’s mother is obligated to let the first
mother do so.80  So still no moral combat. 
3. Self-Defense Against Excused Threats 
Steinhoff only glancingly considers these cases so I too will be brief 
about them.  Given that there are three major categories of excuse,81 there
are three kinds of cases here.  First, are the status excuse cases—often called 
“exemption” cases—that Steinhoff treats as classic innocent aggressor cases: 
the aggressor is too young, too intoxicated, too mentally ill, to realize the 
79. MOORE, supra note 76, at 66.  Analogous cases are the lifeboat case where no
one is already too weak to survive and the Siamese twin’s case, where either twin—but 
only one—could be saved by the use of the organs of the other.
80. See id.
 81. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
483–85 (1997). 
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threat that he is posing.82 Second, the ignorance-mistake cases: the aggressor
reasonably but mistakenly believes that the person he is about to shoot 
means to shoot him.83  Third, the coercion-compulsion cases: the aggressor is
threatening another because he himself is threatened with some consequence
that he finds very hard to contemplate—for example, being enclosed in a
small space—even though avoiding that consequence does not justify his 
action.84 
Notice that unlike either of the kinds of justified aggressors that we have 
considered, aggressors who are not blameworthy because they are excused—
rather than justified—do wrong in attacking; they are wrongful aggressors
even if they are not culpable aggressors.  They thus do not present much
of a problem for self-defense; of course, X is protectedly permitted to kill
such aggressors in self-defense, and they are obligated not to prevent it.85 
To be sure, such excused aggressors may not know they are obligated not 
to resist X’s self-defensive efforts, because they do not know the relevant 
facts or because they lack capacity to draw the right moral conclusions
from those facts.  But those subjective features are neither here nor there
for a deontic logic of obligations, permissions, and/or liberties.  And sticking 
to the relevant, objective features here, there is no moral combat to be found: 
one does no wrong in killing a wrongful aggressor, and he compounds the 
original wrong of his very aggression by seeking to prevent such self-defense.86 
4. Self-Defense Against Innocent Threats
There are more cases we could consider: “innocent shield” cases—where
the shield poses no threat other than his shielding of a culpable aggressor;
“innocent side-effect” cases—where the victim of self-defensive force is
behind rather than in front of a culpable aggressor; et cetera.87  In the interest 
of brevity, I shall peruse but one final example that has come to be known
in the literature as the “innocent threat” case.88 
Nozick’s falling fat-man is the classic example: X is lying at the bottom 
of a well unable to escape; a fat-man (Y) has been pushed into the well through 
no fault of his own and will kill X if his fall is unimpeded; but the fall will
 82. Id. at 485. 
83. Id. at 483–84.  Steinhoff’s example here is the mistaken resident scenario: Mistaken
resident starts to shoot the twin of a well-known serial killer who has the misfortune to
look just like his twin, and the question is whether the innocent twin may prevent this by
shooting first.  Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 219. 
84. MOORE, supra note 81, at 484. 
85. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 note on use of force in self-protection (AM.
LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
86. HURD, supra note 2, at 278–79. 
87. HURD & MOORE, supra note 6, at 58. 
88. E.g., id. at 59–60. 
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not kill Y—no inevitable death of Y here so no argument can be made that 
this can be treated as an acceleration case; X has a ray gun and can vaporize
Y, preventing X’s death; Y has a counter-ray gun that can disable X’s ray 
gun if Y chooses to use it; Z, a bystander, has a third ray gun that can disable
X’s or Y’s ray guns if he, Z, chooses to use it.89 
These are not innocent shield or innocent side-effect cases—because Y 
is a threat, albeit an innocent one. These also are not innocent aggressors 
or minimally responsible threat cases—because Y has not acted in any 
way to make himself a threat.  He is just falling with gravity making him 
into an innocent threat to X’s life. 
Using the template of questions earlier devised,90 I understand Steinhoff
to defend the following conclusions about the innocent threat cases:
1. 	 By hypothesis, Y is fully innocent in his falling toward X. 
Because Y’s falling is not an action by Y, his deontic 
status is not an issue. 
2a. 	 X has a liberty-right to vaporize Y with X’s ray gun. 
2b. 	 Y has a liberty-right to prevent Y from using his ray gun
to vaporize X. 
2c. X has a liberty-right to prevent Y from preventing X in 
the use of X’s ray gun to vaporize Y. 
3a. Z, if he is a friend of X’s, has a liberty-right to use his ray
gun either to vaporize Y or to aid X in doing so.
3b. 	 Y has a liberty-right to prevent Z’s assistance of X. 
3c. 	 Z has a liberty-right to prevent Y’s prevention of Z’s
assistance of X. 
4a. 	 Z, if he is a friend of Y’s, has a liberty-right to use his ray
gun to disable X’s ray gun or to assist Y in doing so. 
4b. 	 X has a liberty-right to prevent Z’s assistance of Y. 
4c. 	 Z has a liberty-right to prevent X’s prevention of Z’s
assistance of Y.91 
Admittedly, I feel the tug of the intuitions behind Steinhoff’s view of 
these cases.92  If I were to adopt Steinhoff’s conclusions, however, I would
 89. 	See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34–35 (1999).
90. 	See supra pp. 322–24. 
91. 	See Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 164–84. 
92. See Michael S. Moore, Responses and Appreciations, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND
METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 343, 388–90 (Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., 2016). 
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strip them of any moral dimensions.  I would do this by not stating those 
conclusions in terms of rights or permissions, but in terms of naked
liberties, which is what he may think anyway.  So construed, Steinhoff’s 
conclusions then are that in no sense do X, Y, or Z have moral rights to
do what they are at liberty to do.93  True enough, they have no moral duty 
not to do these things nor does anyone have a right that they not do these 
things—but they have no moral duty not to rub their eyes, clear their
throats, or think whatever thoughts they like, nor does anyone have a right 
they not do these things, either.  An absence of duty and an absence of its
correlative claim-right do not make for a kind of moral thing, no more 
than putting positive sounding labels on absent elephants—calling those
of them which would belong to me, no-elephants, and calling others that 
would belong to you, smeliphants—would transform such absences into 
kinds of elephants. 
It may well be that Steinhoff in some sense agrees with this conclusion 
of amorality—at least in these cases—despite his explicit talk of “liberty-
rights.”94  For Steinhoff denies that his preferred solution to the innocent 
threat cases is a matter of “deep and eternal truths about self-defense.”95 
There is thus not “‘one right answer’ to the problem of the non-responsible
threat.”96  It all depends, Steinhoff tells us, on what people think in each 
society, and if they think differently in their society than we do in ours, then
the answers given earlier will be different and will be right for that society.97 
My perhaps overly charitable reading of this is not to take at face value
the moral relativism that Steinhoff here expresses.98  Rather, I prefer to 
construe him to sense that on his own analysis there is no morally right action
for X, Y, or Z.  There is only a moral state of nature where X, Y, and Z may 
do as they please, because morality—true morality—does not speak to such
situations.99
 93. See Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 164. 
94. Id. at 22, 163–64, 191. 
95. Id. at 185. 
96. Id. at 186. 
97. Id. at 105, 124. 
98. See id. at 161. The reason for charity here is because relativism is such a hopeless 
metaethics.  On this, see, for example, Hurd’s takedown of relativism, HURD, supra note
2, at 27–61. 
99. Bernard Williams once urged—seconded by Tom Nagel—that in situations beyond
the threshold of awful consequences contemplated by a threshold deontology, morality
loses its voice. Williams’ famous example of this was his “Captain Pedro,” who forces
upon you the choice of executing one innocent villager else he will execute the entire 
village.  J.J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 98–99
(1973).  I express some reservations about so construing threshold deontology in MOORE, 
supra note 81, at 719–724. 
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In any case, my own resolution of the innocent threat cases is different.
I liken them to the innocent shield cases, where X, the innocent shield, 
seeks to defend himself from Y shooting through X to kill Z, a culpable 
aggressor against Y.  My conclusion in those cases is that Y is not permitted 
or at liberty to shoot through X; Y is obligated not to do so even though 
that means that Z—the culpable aggressor—will kill him (Y).  Similarly,
X in the falling fat-man case is obligated not to vaporize Y, the innocent 
threat—meaning that if X does so, Y may prevent it and so may Z—and 
meaning that X is obligated not to prevent the preventative efforts of Y
and Z in this regard. For the only differences between the shield and the
falling fat-man are: (1) the motion of the threat but not of the shield and
(2) the need—for defense of X—for the absence of the threat’s body as 
compared to the indifference to the presence or absence of the shield’s body.
These do not recommend themselves as morally freighted differences.100 
On the solution recommended here, there will never be an amoral, state-
of-nature free-for-all in the innocent threat case.  Rather, X is obligated 
not to vaporize Y, Y is protectedly permitted to prevent X’s vaporizing of 
Y, and X is obligated not to prevent Y’s prevention in this regard.  Further, 
Z is protectedly permitted to aid Y in Y’s prevention of X’s self-defensive
efforts, Z is obligated not to aid X in X’s self-defensive efforts, X is obligated 
not to prevent Z’s efforts in this regard, and Z is protectedly permitted to
prevent any such preventative effort by X.  On this solution, too, there is 
no moral combat. 
V. CONCLUSION
I conclude that no moral combat exists in cases of self-defense, not in 
the classic blameworthy aggressor self-defense scenarios where Steinhoff 
agrees that there is no moral combat, but also, in the extended self-defense
cases where the aggressor is in some way not blameworthy—because that
aggressor’s aggressive action is justified, excused, or not even an action.
In the subclass of those latter cases where there is an amoral free-for-all
of mere naked liberties, there would be no moral combat because nothing 
moral depends on who wins the actual combat taking place in such scenarios. 
Thus, Steinhoff has no need to identify the right to self-defense that we
each possess as a mere “liberty-right”—a naked permission or a naked liberty.101 
100. I recognize that those drawn to various using versions of deontological ethics 
may balk at these assertions.
101.  Just War Theory, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
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It can and should rather be seen as a protected permission to defend oneself, 
a permission—whose correlative duty of non-prevention by others—rules 
out the possibility of moral combat.  Because this is what morality should 
be like, it is nice it is like that.  Moral combat is not an inevitable feature 
of our moral life that we just have to put up with, and the malevolent
Greek god imagined earlier will just have to find other amusements. 
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